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NIETZSCHE AND ARETAIC LEGAL THEORY
Kyron Huigens

INTRODUCTION

What do ascetic ideals mean? Nietzsche answered this
question regarding artists, women, the disabled, the disgruntled,
priests, philosophers, Wagner, Schopenhauer, free-thinkers, and
scientists.^ I want to answer it regarding Anglo-American legal
theorists. Nietzsche also offered advice on how to escape
asceticism, and I want to show how legal theorists ought to take
that advice. Anglo-American legal theory is, in all its present
varieties, imbued with slave morahty and nihihsm. It can be
imbued with the aristocratic ideal and master morality. Nietzsche
points us in the direction of aretaic legal theory—^that is, a legal
theory premised on virtue ethics. I will show how Nietzsche does
this and what it means in the theory of punishment—a subject that
Nietzsche treats at length in the Genealogy of Morality. The
aretaic is a significant theme in Nietzsche's work, but it has been
neglected by legal theorists.^ Post-modernists have focused almost
exclusively on Nietzsche's perspectivism and its implications for
legal language and the law's claim to authority. To some, the idea
of indeterminacy in language, value, and meaning has proved to be
endlessly fascinating.
But when it is read in this way,
perspectivism is at most a peripheral concern in Nietzsche's
thought. The principal statement of perspectivism in Essay III,
section 12 (III.12.) of Genealogy, for example, is a digression.^ The
next section, III.13, begins with the sentence "[b]ut to return," and
the subject to which Nietzsche returns is the ascetic ideal's pitting
1 See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY 72-128 (Keith
Ansell-Pearson ed., Carol Diethe trans., 1994).
2 See Robert C. Solomon, Nietzsche ad hominem: Perspectivism, Personality, and
Ressentiment Revisited, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO NIETZSCHE 180, 211
(Bemd Magnus & Kathleen M. Higgins eds., 1996) (describing Nietzsche's objective in
moral theory as "an ethics of the virtues not unlike Aristotle's").
3 See NIETZSCHE, supra note 1, at 92 (describing objectivity as exercising power over
perspective instead of over detached observation).
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death against life, inducing nausea in man, and increasing the
power of the priestly caste.'' These are among Nietzsche's main
concerns in the Genealogy as a whole, and an exclusive focus on
his perspectivism runs the risk of serious misunderstanding. An
obsessive concern with indeterminacy in language, value, and
meaning effectively aspires to a kind of austerity of thought and
commitment that is unambiguously nihilistic and unambiguously
condemned by Nietzsche.^ There is a Yes in Nietzsche's work, not
merely a No, and it is the Yes that I want to emphasize.
The main thrust of Nietzsche's argument in the Genealogy of
Morality is famihar to any moderately serious student of his
thought. The triumph of Judeo-Christian values and categories is
the philosophical equivalent of a successful slave revolt. The
classical ideal of man stresses his active, warrior side: man's power,
courage, ruthlessness, his joy at being ahve, and his wilhngness to
dominate. The good is that which pertains to this flourishing of
human energy and activity. The good is the noble, the successful,
the naturally aristocratic. The bad is the lowly, the base, the
humble.® But this is an ordering of the world that lowly, base,
humbled people cannot abide, and the devious genius of
Christianity, for Nietzsche, is that it inverts the morality of the
aristocratic masters. It identifies the good with the quahties of
slaves—^the meek, the weak, and the powerless—^and promises that
they shall inherit the earth.^ The good becomes a matter of purity,
self-abnegation, deprivation—^the ascetic ideal—which ultimately
leads to self-loathing and nihilism.^
Part of the recovery of the aristocratic ideal is indeed the
'' See id. at 93.
^ Consider this passage from Genealogy.
[Modem historiography] rejects all teleology, it does not want to "prove"
anything any more; it scoms playing the judge, and shows good taste there,—it
affirms as little as it denies, it asserts and "describes".... All this is ascetic to a
high degree; but to an even higher degree it is nihilistic, make no mistcike about
it! You see a sad, hard but determined gaze,—an eye peers out, like a lone
explorer at the North Pole (perhaps so as not to peer in? or peer back?...).
Here there is snow, here life is silenced; the last crows heard here are called
"what for?," "in vain", "ruida"—here nothing flourishes or grows any more ...
Id. at 123. Incidentally, there are remarkable echoes of this passage in the early modernist
poems of Wallace Stevens, especially in The Snow Man, in which Stevens writes, "[ojne
must have a mind of winter/ To regard the frost and the boughs/ Of the pine-trees cmsted
with snow" and to be "the listener, who listens in the snowy And, nothing himsp.lf
beholds/ Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is." WALLACE STEVENS, The
Snow Man, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF WALLACE STEVENS 9-10 (1957). Stevens's
later poems, such as Landscape with Boat, seem to overcome this nihilism. See id. at 241
("An anti-master man, floribimd ascetic
").
® See NIETZSCHE, supra note 1, at 21-27.
' See id. at 16-20.
® See id. at 93-94.
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recognition of indeterminacy in language, value, and meaning.
The choice between master morahty and slave morahty, between
competing sets of good and evil, is a free and fundamental one.
The ordering of the moral world is a matter of willing it to be so.
However, there is more to Nietzsche's prescription than this.
Because Judeo-Christian religion claims the transcendental
warrant of an all-powerful God, to see the possibility of a choice
between two kinds of morality—^to position oneself, for the
moment of choice, beyond good and evil—^requires a recognition
that God is dead and a rejection of the authority of priests.
Twenty-first century readers can manage this step more easily than
most of Nietzsche's nineteenth century readers. But the next steps
are much harder, because the ascetic ideal extends well beyond the
boundaries of Judeo-Christian religion. The ascetic ideal is
rephcated in both the deontological morality of Kant and in the
scientific morality of the English Utihtarians. If we abjure the
certainties of transcendental reason and natural science but
replace them with nothing, then we have done nothing more than
hasten the slide toward nihilism that is implicit in the ascetic ideal.
This dilemma is acute for us because of our democratic distaste for
the aristocratic ideal, and it is compounded by the fact that
Nietzsche's descriptions of that ideal—including his references to
"the blond beast" and the dominance of the Aryan race—are the
passages that the Nazis found most congenial.' We need a
different way to understand master morality and the aristocratic
ideal.
Current Anglo-American legal theory is caught in this very
dilemma and displays this same need. American law, at least, is
constitutionally cut off from the support of revealed rehgion. With
one exception, which I will discuss below, deontological morality
has never played a significant role in Anglo-American law or legal
theory. This leaves empirical consequentialism as the mainstay,
which takes many forms other than classic English Utilitarianism.
One is the crude consequentiahsm of "pohcy analysis," in which
the unrecognized and unexamined assumption is that law is a set of
prescriptions that serve as incentive structures designed and
administered to produce preferred states of affairs. The more selfconscious and rigorous version of this consequentialist legal theory
is, of course, law and economics. Nietzsche would have predicted
a bad end for law and economics, because its commitment to an
austere conception of truth would lead to nihilism. And Nietzsche
would have been right. While it might seem that law and
' See id. at 26.
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economics has conquered the world, the truth is that in the last five
years or so it has reached a point of exhaustion and contradiction
that, amazingly enough, points us in the same direction that
Nietzsche does, that is, toward aretaic legal theory.'"
We have ample reason, then, to stop obsessing over
indeterminacy and to take up Nietzsche's more central concerns. I
propose to do this in the three Parts that follow. Part I considers
the deontologjcal theory of punishment—^the one area in which
Kant has had some influence in Anglo-American legal thought—
and Nietzsche's criticism of it. Part II presents a virtue-based, or
aretaic, theory of punishment as an alternative to both the
deontological theory and the consequentiahst theory of
punishment. Part III argues that Nietzsche's analysis of master
and slave moraUty points toward the aretaic theory of punishment
and, more broadly, to aretaic legal theory as a relatively
unproblematic version of master morahty. In sum, to cast the
theory of punishment in Nietzschean terms offers an escape from
the ascetic ideal and nihihsm, an opportunity to recover the
aristocratic ideal in Anglo-American legal theory, and a way to
give post-modem legal theory a positive as well as a negative
critique.
I.

THE DEONTOLOGICAL THEORY OF PUNISHMENT

Nietzsche snickers at Kant's divorce of beauty from interest.
The artist is sexually interested in his model, Nietzsche observes,
and this has everything to do with the beauty the artist finds there.
To suppose otherwise is to display the naivete of a country
parson." But beneath its comic aspect, Kant's desiccated account
of beauty is significant. The austerity of Kantian aesthetics tells us
that it belongs to the ascetic ideal. Kant's conception of human
rationality involves stripping human existence of its vitahty and
suppressing one's inclinations to strength, engagement, and
dominance in favor of a cool, insipid detachment that is
indistinguishable from the weakness of slaves."
Kantian morahty is vastly more interesting and complex than
the morality of a country parson, but it is no less ascetic than the
Kantian account of beauty. Just as Kant detaches interest fi"om
See Kyron Huigens, Law, Economics, and the Skeleton of Value Fallacy, 89 CAL. L.
REV. 537, 565-68 (2001) (reviewing BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass Sunstein

ed., 2000)).
See NIETZSCHE, supra note 1, at 79.
See id. at 94-95.
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beauty, he detaches the attributes and interests of human beings
from his account of the human agent." For Kant, there is a bare
will at the center of human agency, a faculty of rational choice that
can commit one to action without the aid or influence of emotion,
and without reference to one's other attributes such as strength or
sexuahty.^'^ The Kantian account of responsibility rests on this
austere conception of the will. Deprived of attributes, the will is
unconstrained and free to choose the path that reason
determines." This expands the scope of responsibility because it
contracts the extent to which the agent might say, "I could not
have done otherwise." Nietzsche connects Kantian morality to
slave morahty and the ascetic ideal with the image of a bird of
prey.
[N]o wonder, then, if the entrenched, secretly smouldering
emotions of revenge and hatred put this belief [in the agent as
an austere subject] to their own use and, in fact, do not defend
any belief more passionately than that the strong are free to be
weak, and the birds of prey are free to be lambs:—^in this way,
they gain the right to make the birds of prey responsible for
being birds of prey
"
In this conception of responsibihty, Nietzsche locates the modem
apparatus of punishment, including the nuances of intention,
accident, and insanity."
Nietzsche does not dispute that punishment as presently
conceived tums on Kantian categories; his criticism is that
punishments present functioning bears no relationship to
punishment's origins. The Kantian account of responsibihty and
punishment appropriates older forms and practices and has shaped
them to new purposes." Nietzsche himself expresses little or no
hope for the recovery of the older understanding of punishment,
but it is important to see that if it could be recovered the resulting
theory of punishment would represent a partial restoration of the
aristocratic ideal. In the law that deals most immediately with
right conduct and responsibihty, we would escape the influence of
asceticism, begin to appreciate human beings fuhy for what they
are, and replace the objective of oppressive control with the
objective of human flourishing.
The theory of punishment may be the only area in which
Kantian morahty has had any substantial influence on AngloI'l
15
15
17
15

See id. at 82-85.
See id. at 28.
See id. at 28-29.
Id.
See id. at 42-43,58-59.
See id. at 54-56.
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American law and legal theory. The reason that this occurred is
obscure, but part of the explanation is that Kant's English
contemporary Jeremy Bentham advanced an influential theory of
punishment that, while it was Utilitarian rather than deontological,
was as strongly voluntaristic as Kant's theory of punishment. This
was especially true of the Kantian and the Benthamite conceptions
of criminal fault. Bentham argued that punishment must be
confined to those criminal acts that are committed with a mens rea,
construed as intentional state toward the act constituting the
wrongdoing on the occasion of wrongdoing. Otherwise, Bentham
thought, the justification of deterrence would not hold: no one can
choose not to do something that he is unaware of doing.^' Kant's
emphasis on the will as the seat of moral agency leads the Kantian
theorist of punishment likewise to construe criminal fault in
intentional terms. The argument is that one cannot be responsible
for wrongdoing that is not freely chosen, and that one cannot
choose to do wrong in the way required by responsibility if one is
not fully aware of the nature or the consequences of one's
conduct.^" This accord on the construction of criminal fault as a
matter of intentional states made Anglo-American theorists, in
their characteristic practical-minded eclecticism, at least tolerant
of Kantian ideas that were not, strictly speaking congruent with
consequentialism—^such as the justification of punishment by duty
founded in reason alone.^^ As a result, one finds strained
variations on Kantian themes in Anglo-American punishment
theory—^notably consequentialist reconstructions of retribution as
the welfare-enhancing satisfaction of an instinct for revenge.^^
More recently, genuine deontological theories of punishment have
appeared in the Anglo-American literature.^^
The importation of Kantian morality into Anglo-American
See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 172-75 (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970) (1780).
^ See Stephen J. Morse, The "Guilty Mind:" Mens Rea, in HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 207, 211 (D.K. Kagehiro & W.S. Laufer eds., 1992) (describing
the "just deserts" position as holding that "there is no blameworthiness unless there is an
appropriate mental state such as intent or knowledge, that marks an actor's offending
conduct as 'hers'"). See also Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from
Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 632,634-35 (1963) (making such an argument).
21 See JEROME MICHAEL & HERBERT WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ADMINISTRATION: CASES, STATUTES AND COMMENTARIES 7-8 (1940) (discussing the
Kantian theory of retribution as the justification for punishment).
22 See 2 SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 80 (1883) (describing retribution as a welfare-enhancing diversion of the
instinct toward revenge).
22 See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978); Jean
Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 1659,1686 (1992).
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theory of punishment has proved to be significant because,
Bentham aside, the Anglo-American construction of criminal fault
was not predominantly intentionalist. The fault category of
malice, for example, had always included not only express
malice—^an intention toward one's wrongdoing—^but also implied
mahce—2l depraved disposition resulting in wrongdoing.^" But the
trend in the last century, in America and in England, was toward
the eradication of broad, dispositional categories of fault and the
substitution of an intentional states analysis.^ So, for example,
mistake of fact is now analyzed as a missing mem rea: The murder
defendant who thought he was shooting a deer cannot have had
the purpose to kill a human being; the absent-minded professor
who takes someone else's raincoat in the good faith belief that it is
his own has not even recklessly taken someone else's property, and
so on.^® This is by no means an obvious or inevitable way to
analyze mistake, and indeed it creates some serious anomalies^'
^ See R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY: PHILOSOPHY OF
ACTION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 1-3,15-20 (1990) (describing the abolition by statute of
constructive malice murder in England and its subsequent revival by the courts (citing R.
V. Hyam, [1975] AC. 55)); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.1(a), at 653-55 (3d
ed. 2000) (recounting the history of common law murder in terms of an expanding
category of implied malice).
^ See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, cmt. 1 (1985) (explaining that "the Code's basic
requirement that unless some element of mental culpability is proved with respect to each
material element of the offense, no valid criminal conviction may be obtained"); Richard
H.S. Tur, Subjectivism and Objectivism: Towards Synthesis, in ACTION AND VALUE IN
CRIMINAL LAW 213 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993) (assessing the increasing dominance
of the intentionahst or subjectivist construction of criminal fault in England).
See 1 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 62(b), at 245-52 (1984).
^ The principal paradox is the acquittal of the unreasonably mistaken rapist, as
illustrated in the case of Regina v. Morgan, 1976 A.C. 182 (H.L. 1976). In that case, the
defendants claimed that they genuinely believed that the victim of a sequential rape, the
wife of their commanding officer, had consented to have sex with them. The defendants
claimed that they were extremely drunk, and that the commander persuaded them that his
wife was "kinky," and that she would be "turned on" by being raped. In light of these
representations, the defendants interpreted the victim wife's overt refusals and resistance
to intercourse as consent. On an intentionalist construction of mistake and fault, the
Morgan defendants were entitled to an instruction to acquit because (if the jury believed
their story) the defendants lacked a mental state of purpose, knowledge, or recklessness
regarding the victim's non-consent to intercourse—an essential element of rape. But these
defendants were nevertheless at fault, and their fault lay in the combination of their
particular circumstances, including their severe volimtary intoxication, their poor choice of
friends, their evident abihty to make themselves believe whatever they found it convenient
to believe, and a general moral obtuseness, £is evidenced by their failure to perceive not
only a woman's genuine resistance to forced sexual intercourse but also the fact that even
a simulated rape is an act degrading to human dignity. The Morgan defendants were
denied a jury instruction to acqtiit based on their lack of any intentional state regarding
nonconsent. This, the Law Lords held, was error, as implied by the intentionalist
construction of fault. However, the Lords rejected that construction of fault in their
disposition of the case. They affirmed the convictions because conviction and punishment
were nevertheless consistent with reason and justice. See id. (appeal from the English
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that a broader, dispositional inquiry into the reasonableness of the
mistake is able to avoid.^® Nevertheless, the intentional states
construction of fault has dominated the analysis of mistake. Given
the increasing frequency with which Kant is cited in the AngloAmerican literature over the same period, in spite of his theory's
poor fit in most respects,^' it seems likely that Kantian voluntarism
reinforced this trend.'"
However, the triumph of the intentional states construction of
fault is far from complete and, at this juncture, its complete
triumph seems unhkely. In spite of the efforts of a legion of
reform-minded theorists during most of the last century, the
doctrines of criminal negligence, felony murder, depraved heart
murder, transferred intent, accomphce liability, unreasonable
mistake, strict liabihty, and intoxication as a hmited defense still
persist as prominent features in Anglo-American criminal law.''
They have been neither eradicated from criminal codes nor
deprived of their essential characteristic: a non-intentional
conception of fault consisting of a broad inquiry into the
disposition and character of the accused, as those features might
be inferred from his actions and the context in which they
occurred." Once recognized, this situation appears as something
Court of Appeals); see id. at 203-04 (Lord Cross); see id. at 214-15 (Lord Hailsham); see id.
at 237-39 (Lord Fraser) (affirming rape convictions of several British military officers on
these facts, citing the Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, c. 19, § 2(1) (Eng.), and authorizing the
affirmance of convictions in spite of error when not inconsistent with justice).
^ See Tur, supra note 25, at 219-22 (making this point regarding Morgan and similar
cases).
See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (reporting, "[rjetribution is no
longer the dominant objective of the criminal law").
30 See Peter Brett, An Enquiry Into Criminal Guilt 51 (1960) (unpubUshed J.D.
dissertation. Harvard University Law School) (on file with author) (describing Kant's
conception of retribution); MICHAEL & WECHSLER, supra note 21; LLOYD L. WEINREB,
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENT, QUESTIONS 422-23 (1969) (excerpting Kant's
account of retribution) (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF
JUSTICE 100-01 (J. Ladd trans., 1965) (1797)); Hall, supra note 20, at 636 (citing Kant,
among others, for the proposition that voluntariness is required for fault).
31 See Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387, 420-23 (2002)
(describing the persistence of these doctrines as evidence of the inadequacy of the
intentional states construction of criminal fault).
33 For example, from the point of view of the intentional states construction of fault,
depraved mind murder is utterly baffling. See Bernard E. Gegan, More Cases of Depraved
Mind Murder: The Problem of Mens Rea, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 429, 432-37 (1990)
(describing some courts' unsuccessful efforts to reduce the doctrine to recklessness). This
is because the doctrine addresses a state of character instead of a state of mind. In such
cases:
It may become clear that the actor has a character flaw more blameworthy than
that shown by a single indiscretion; it may even be established that he simply
holds human life without value. This is not a specific mental state formed at the
moment of action, such as intent or reckless disregard. Rather, it is an immoral
predisposition to hcirm
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of a theoretical crisis: Large portions of the criminal law are simply
unexplained and unexplainable under either a consequentialist or
a deontological theory of punishment because of those theories'
commitment to an intentional states construction of fault.
II.

THE ARETAIC THEORY OF PUNISHMENT

These fundamental difficulties in the criminal law require a
fundamental solution—something on the order of an entirely new
theory of punishment. Theories of punishment are conventionally
said to be of two types: the deterrence theory of punishment and
the retributive theory of punishment.^^ This typology is confused.
Deterrence and retribution are not theories of punishment; they
are functions of punishment—as are incapacitation, the concrete
expression of public norms of behavior, the cathartic effect on the
public of forcefully condemning violations of those norms, and so
on. Neither deterrence nor retribution nor any of the other
conceivable functions of punishment serves to justify punishment
unless some moral theory grants that function justifying force. Nor
does the function of deterrence or retribution explain wrongdoing,
ground the excuses, solve the riddle of proportionahty, or answer
any of the other questions that the practice of punishment poses.
Any explanatory power that those functions have comes from a
moral theory that weaves them into an explanation. Thus, what is
commonly called the deterrence theory of punishment is more
accurately described as the consequentialist theory of punishment.
Consequentialism gives deterrence and the other social welfarepromoting effects of punishment their justifying and explanatory
power. The so-called retributive theory of punishment is better
viewed as a deontological theory of punishment in which the duty
of imposing retribution justifies punishment, and other, similarlygrounded moral duties lie behind the excuses, the structure and
Id. at 437.
33 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 21-35 (1994)
(presenting only utilitarian and retributive justifications for punishment by means of
selections from Bentham and Kant, respectively); SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J.
SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES; CASES AND MATERIALS 102-19 (6th
ed. 1995) (same); PAUL H. ROBINSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL LAW 32 (2d ed.
1995) (quoting K. Greenawalt, Legal Ihinishment, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND
JUSTICE 1337 (S. Kadish ed., 1983)) ("[t]he dominant approaches to justification [of
punishment] are retributive and utilitarian"); RICHARD G. SINGER & MARTIN R.
GARDNER, CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT: CASES, MATERIALS, AND READINGS IN
CRIMINAL LAW 84-124 (2d ed. 1996) (presenting only utilitarian and retributive

justifications for punishment by means of selections from Bentham and Kant,
respectively).
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content of criminal wrongdoing, and so on.
If we view the theory of punishment this way, then a gap in
the theoretical picture comes into view. Consequentialism and
deontological morality are only two of the three major traditions
in philosophical ethics.'" The third is virtue ethics, which begins
with Aristotle and which is the subject of a burgeoning modem
literature.'' An aretaic or virtue ethics theory of punishment was
advanced as early as the 1970s and several partial accounts of it
have been given since then.'®
This theory of punishment is of interest to the student of
Nietzsche because the Aristotelian conception of the responsible
agent is richer than that of Kant.'^ Aristotle's rational agent is
deeply deliberative, in the sense that he rationally considers not
only how to achieve his desires, and not only whether his desires
meet the demands of reason, but also the substance and content of
^ See MARCIA W. BARON ET AL., THREE METHODS OF ETHICS; A DEBATE (1997).
35 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962). Virtue
ethics was revived in modem philosophy by Anscombe, see G.E.M. Anscombe, Modem
Moral Philosophy, reprinted in VIRTUE ETHICS 26 (Roger Crisp & Michael Slote eds.,
1997), and is the subject of extensive literature. See Roger Crisp & Michael Slote,
Introduction, in VIRTUE ETHICS, supra, at 1, 3-4. See also ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON
VIRTUE ETHICS (1999); ALISDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1997); JUSTIN
OAKLEY, MORALITY AND THE EMOTIONS (1992); MICHAEL SLOTE, FROM MORALITY
TO VIRTUE (1992); MICHAEL STOCKER, PLURAL AND CONFLICTING VALUES 338-42
(1990); Justin Oaidey, Varieties of Virtue Ethics, 9 RATIO 128, 129 (1996); Michael
Stocker, Values and Purposes: The Limits of Teleology and the Ends of Frien^hip, 78 J.
PHIL. 747 (1981); Christine Swanton, Profiles of the Virtues, 76 PAC. PHIL. Q. 47 (1995);
Christine Swanton, Satisficing and Virtue, 90 J. PHIL. 33 (1993).
3® See Peter Arenella, Character, Choice, and Moral Agency, in CRIME, CULPABILITY,
AND REMEDY 59, 61-65 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1990) (arguing that so-called
rational choice theory is inadequate to describe the criminal law's concern with character);
Qaire O. Frnkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account of the Defense in Law, 37 ARIZ. L.
REV. 251, 252-53 (1995) (relying on Aristotle's conception of judgment to give an account
of duress in terms of states of character); Kyron Huigens, Homicide in Aretaic Terms, 6
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002) [hereinafter Huigens, Homicide] (considering
depraved heart murder and provocation in terms of an aretaic, or virtue-based, theory of
punishment); Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the Penalty Phase, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1195 (2000)
[hereinafter Huigens, Rethinking] (examining the constitutional regulation of death
sentencing in terms of an aretaic theory of punishment); Kyron Huigens, The Dead End of
Deterrence, and Beyond, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 948 (2000) [hereinafter Huigens,
Deterrence] (examining the nature of criminal fault in terms of an aretaic theory of
punishment); Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1458-62
(1995) [hereinafter Huigens, Virtue] (examining the justification of punishment in aretaic
terms); Edmund L. Pincoffs, Legal Responsibility and Moral Character, 19 WAYNE L.
REV. 905, 918 (1973) (arguing that punishment represents a demand that one develop and
exhibit certain character traits).
3^ This is tme on a conventional reading of Kant as advancing a deontological moral
theory. Barbara Herman argues persuasively that this conventional reading is a
misreading of Kant. BARBARA HERMAN, THE PRACTICE OF MORAL JUDGMENT (1993).
Nancy Sherman argues in a similar vein that Kant's doctrine of virtue is closer than one
might think to that of Aristotle. NANCY SHERMAN, MAKING A NECESSITY OF VIRTUE:
ARISTOTLE AND KANT ON VIRTUE (1997).
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his desires. Aristotle's rational agent considers the place of each
of his desires in the context of his life as a whole. He considers his
desires critically; he asks how he came to have them, whether he
ought to have them at all, and whether some other desires might
not serve him better. The rational agent's good, from this
perspective, is much more than the simple satisfaction of desires
and more than the rational self-mastery that Kant describes. The
rational agent's good, in Aristotle's view, is to be to the fullest
extent possible what each human being essentially is: a rational,
active, and political being.^®
One might ask, why should I create such a life rather than just
satisfy my immediate desires? Here we encounter Aristotle's
notion of a distinct kind of human flourishing. Our desires have a
structure, because they are directed toward one end that we
pursue for its own sake: eudaimonia. The word is often translated
as "happiness," but eudaimonia, the final end and self-sufficient
good, is better translated as "the best possible life" or "human
flourishing." The best hfe or the highest human good depends on
the characteristic function—^the ergon—of human beings, which
Aristotle identifies as the ability to reason. Specifically, he
concludes that the ergon of man is the life of rationality in action,
as opposed to the mere possession of rationahty.®' The centerpiece
of aretaic ethics is thus an exemplary practical rationality or
practical wisdom—^in Greek, "phronesis." Phronesis is the ability
to dehberate on and frame an overall conception of the good life—
that is, the flourishing life—^and to integrate one's particular
choices into this all-encompassing conception. The person
possessed of phronesis, the phronimos, is a person of mature
judgment who has the capacity to identify and pursue the good
amid the contingencies of practical human affairs.'"
Eudaimonia, then, is not mere contentment or satisfaction,
but the attainment of distinctively human ends. We should hve a
life of rationality in action not to conform with transcendental
reason or to comply with duty, but because such a life is the best
we can have."' In this light, to seek the satisfaction of the desires
that I just happen to have would be unworthy; self-respect requires
me to attend not only to my immediate desires, nor even just to my
future desires, but primarily to the human capacities that underhe
my desires. It makes sense for me, as a rational agent, to seek a
hfe that draws on the greatest range of those capacities—a point
^ See Huigens, Virtue, supra note 36, at 1447-49.
See id. ax. 1449-52.
See id. at 1454-56.
5ee id. at 1450-52.
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that John Rawls, following Aristotle, took as a starting point of his
theory of justice.^^
This responsibility to oneself is the ground of all
responsibility.
Aristotle sees a direct connection between
eudaimonia and life among others. The final good is selfsufficient, he argues, in a special sense:
[W]e define something as self-sufficient not by reference to the
'self alone. We do not mean a man who lives his life in
isolation, but a man who also lives with parents, children, a
wife, and friends and fellow citizens generally, since man is by
nature a social and political being."^

If one is mystified by this intimate cormection between one's final,
highest good and political life, the confusion may be due to an
unexamined assumption that serving the good of others or of all
necessarily detracts from one's own. Aristotle's conception of
eudaimonia and its cormection to the development of human
capacities helps us to see an alternative sort of altruism. Aristotle
describes friendship as concern for another in himself, because of
himself, or because he is who he is. I am concerned with my friend
as I am with myself. I care about his development and the scope of
his life, just as I do for my own. Indeed, these concerns are
indistinguishable; in seeking the good of my friend, I encounter
additional opportunities for my own self-realization. Simply
because humans live together rather than alone, the complete
human life that I seek wiU entail a significant involvement with
others and with the construction of their lives. The same principle
extends beyond friendship to political life. "My self-realization
requires political involvement because such involvement presents
additional, necessary opportunities to draw upon and develop my
human capacities.""" It is in this sense that Aristotle sees humans
as essentially political animals. The virtuous life, for Aristotle, is
the life of full involvement with the community's good.
From Aristotle's conceptions of virtue and responsibility, one
can derive a theory of punishment that resolves the longstanding
tension between the consequentialist and deontological theories of
punishment, with their nearly exclusive emphases on social welfare
and retribution, respectively. More importantly, an aretaic, or
virtue-based, theory of punishment solves the many doctrinal
conundrums produced by the mistaken assumption that intentions
Rawls uses what he calls the "Aristotelian Principle" as a principle of motivation in
the original position. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 427-28 (1971).
ARISTOTLE, supra note 35, at I.7.1097b; see id. at IX.9.1169b (reiterating that "man
is a social and political being" in the context of discussing the relationship between
friendship and happiness).
Huigens, Virtue, supra note 36, at 1451-52.
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are identical with criminal fault, instead of being merely indicative
of criminal fault.
One idea in Aristotelian ethics that modem readers find
puzzling is Aristotle's attributing responsibility for character to the
agent whose character it is."^ We tend to assume that we simply
have the attitudes, propensities, and values that we have, as a
product of our upbringing. From that perspective, responsibility
for one's character seems an absurd notion. But Aristotle's richer
conception of responsibility helps to make sense of his attribution
of responsibihty for character. If I have the capacity to reflect on
my ends, the means by which I would achieve them, and the
relation of both to a whole life, then I have the capacity as well to
shape my life in each particular decision that I make. I am
responsible for my character to the extent I am responsible for the
decisions I make about the ends and effects that shape it. My
parents and teachers are responsible for the inculcation of virtue in
me initially, but after a certain point that responsibihty becomes
mine.
The aretaic theory of punishment takes the inculcation of
sound practical judgment—^virtue, in its correct, technical sense—
to be the principal justifying purpose of punishment. Accordingly,
criminal liability tums on Aristotle's attribution of responsibility
for the state of one's character. The notion is that one deserves
punishment if one has failed to intemalize legal rules sufficiently
and to adjust one's standing motivations accordingly."® Where the
capacity for this kind of control is absent, as in the case of insanity,
we will excuse wrongdoing,"' but where a capable agent's
disordered ends lead him into wrongdoing, we will punish the
wrongdoing."® The inquiry into fault is precisely an inquiry into
whether or not the agent's wrongdoing is a product of flawed or
inadequate practical reasoning, including the practical reasoning
that goes into making up one's ends. If so, and if the particular
wrong done violates a legal prohibition, then punishment is both
morally and legally justified.
This conception of just deserts, or retribution, is far more
robust than anything in the deontological theory of punishment. It
is not premised on a duty to punish arising from another's
violation of other, core moral duties. Virtue ethics is not premised
on duties grounded in reason alone, but on a much broader notion
"5 See id. at 1445-48 (citing TERENCE IRWIN, ARISTOTLE'S RRST PRINCIPLES § 182, at
344 (1988)).

See id. at 1458-62.
See Huigens, Rethinking, supra note 36, at 1245-50.
See Huigens, Deterrence, supra note 36, at 1028-31.
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of human flourishing. It supposes that society engages in a process
in which the attitudes and standing motivations conducive to that
flourishing are recognized as virtues, and some of the rules that are
conducive to the acquisition of these virtues are enacted as laws."'
Punishment plays a role in the process of habituation to virtue
because it instantiates the rules, displays them pubhcly, provides
an incentive to abide by the rules until they are internalized, and
secures the peace against those who cannot acquire virtue in order
to enable those who can to do so.
As the last two points indicate, consequences are not left out
of account in the aretaic theory of punishment, but the theory is a
significant advance over consequentiahst theories of punishment.
The aretaic theory construes deterrence much as H.L.A. Hart did.
Deterrence is not an economy of threats; it is a matter of
internalized legal rules.^° The difference is that Hart saw the
possibility of this internalization as merely a fortunate feature of
rules that extends their consequential efficacy, and viewed not
only fault, but the notion of moral justification of punishment in
the individual case as a fundamental confusion.'" The aretaic
theory of punishment, in contrast, construes the internalization of
legal rules as part of a process of socialization that lies at the core
of responsibility, fault, and the justification of punishment.
The aretaic theory of punishment allows us to solve the
conundrums created by the Kantian and Benthamite conception of
criminal fault as intentional states because it provides an objective
or non-intentional construction of criminal fault, and because it
places a much greater emphasis on ex post adjudication over ex
ante prescription than either the deontological or consequentialist
theories of punishment do. To see this, consider the aretaic
construction of wrongdoing and fault.
Criminal wrongdoing consists of violating the criminal law's
prohibitions. The prohibitory norms that make up the criminal
law are generalizations about proper and improper conduct, drawn
from generations of shared experience. Action-guiding legislation
takes as its models those judgments about the proper course of
action in problematic practical situations that are widely regarded
See Huigens, Virtue, supra note 36, at 1454-56; Huigens, Deterrence, supra note 36, at
1025-27.
50 The term "economy of threats" describes deterrence that operates by explicit
instrumental reasoning aimed at avoiding pain. H.L.A. HART, Legal Responsibility and
Excuses, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 28,
40-44 (1994). Hart contrasts this with deterrence that involves the internalization of legal
rules as obligations that people incorporate into their other aims and plans. See id. at 4450.
51 See id. at 35-40.
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as sound judgments.
The generalizations of these sound
judgments are familiar to us, and almost uncontroversial: that
property ought to be secure; that life and bodily integrity ought to
be preserved; that individual autonomy ought to be respected; and
so on. A criminal code is a relatively detailed set of positively
enacted ethical generalizations of this kind."
In the aretaic theory of punishment, fault is an aspect of
wrongdoing and its adjudication is a necessary complement to the
legislative enactment of these criminal prohibitions." Because
they are generalizations of sound practical judgments in the
relevant sphere of human conduct, each of the conduct rules of the
criminal law presents an implicit demand that the accused should
engage in sound practical reasoning in the circumstances in which
such a crime might be committed. The requirement of fault entails
a retrospective, adjudicative inquiry into this question. The
question before the jury is whether the acts of the accused, in the
particular circumstances of the alleged crime, displayed
inadequate or flawed practical reasoning, including the
deliberations on ends that have gone toward establishing and
maintaining his attitudes and standing motivations.
This
determination by the jury turns on a comparison between the
defendant's judgment in the relevant circumstances—as evidenced
by the particular manner and circumstances of his wrongdoing—
and a sound judgment in the relevant circumstances—as evidenced
by the applicable conduct rules. This comparison between the
defendant's judgment in the relevant circumstances and the sound
judgment that is implicit in the applicable conduct rule leads to the
inference of fault or no-fault. In this way, the justifying rationale
of the conduct rule is brought to bear on the punishment of the
individual offender."
The inference of fault is a necessary step in the imposition of
just punishment. Sound practical reasoning is context-dependent.
That is, we cannot say what the right decision in any situation is, or
was, unless we know not only what alternatives were available, but
also the circumstances under which the choice was made. If part
of the question before the jury is whether the defendant engaged
in sound practical reasoning on the occasion of wrongdoing, then
the conduct rule has to be returned to the level of specific, contextrich practical judgment from which it arose, and in which the
offender acted. The jury performs this specification of the conduct
rule when it applies the law to the facts before it. This adjudicative
See Huigens, Deterrence, supra note 36, at 1024-25.
» See id. at 1028-31.
^ See id.
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specification of the norm complements the legislative
generalization of the norm. If part of the justification of
punishment is the inculcation and maintenance of sound practical
judgment, then just punishment cannot be imposed unless and
until this step is taken.'^
Fault, then, is a necessary inference drawn in adjudication to
the effect that the person who has committed wrongdoing has
done so in a way that calls the quality of his practical reasoning
into question. Both intentional and non-intentional, or objective,
fault work this way. In most cases, an intentional state regarding
harm or a risk of harm denotes fault. However, this intentional
state does not constitute fault. Fault consists of the way in which
the accused has come to do wrong and the particular way in which
he has done wrong. This fault may or may not be denoted by an
intentional state on the occasion of action.'®
The aretaic theory of punishment's account of non-intentional
fault supplements the manifestly inadequate intentional-states
conception of fault that is characteristic of deontological and
consequentialist theories of punishment. The main benefit of this
addition is not to provide a defense of doctrines such as felony
murder or strict liability, but rather to clarify the reason that those
doctrines seem unjust. Strict liability, for example, is often said to
be criminal hability without fault, and is said to be unjust for that
reason. But this is not quite right. In cases of strict liability, some
kind of negligence—^non-intentional fault—^usually can be found in
the transaction. The prosecution need not prove this fault
explicitly, but therein lies the problem. Any moderately skilled
prosecutor can convey this negligence to the jury in his case in
chief, and needs no jury instruction to reap the benefit of that
proof. Yet the defendant is deprived of any formal avenue of
rebutting this implicit case. The problem in strict liability cases is
thus neither liability without fault nor liability premised on nonintentional fault. The problem is the covert, one-sided way in
which non-intentional fault is proved. The injustice of strict
liability is thus a problem pertaining to the principle of legality, not
to the nature of fault.
This clarification—^that many concerns that have been
expressed in terms of the nature of fault are better framed as
See id. at 1029-30. We refrain from punishing those who do wrong without fault
because the inculcation of soimd practical judgment is one of the principal fimctions of
punishment. It would be expressively irrational—even if it might be consequentially
effective—^to punish one whose actions do evince soimd practical reasoning, even if these
actions constitute a nominal violation of the prohibitory norm. See Huigens, Rethinking,
supra note 36, at 1246-51.
^ See Huigens, Deterrence, supra note 36, at 1029-30.
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concerns about legality—^is an important one. We write rules
about fault in terms of intentional states, not because this reflects
anything about the nature of fault, but because such rules serve the
rule of law better than rules written in non-intentional terms. This
matters because we need to see that nothing in principle stops us
from writing legally adequate rules about fault in non-intentional
terms." Indeed, the constitutionalization of death sentencing is in
large part an effort to do just this. The failures of that initiative
are due almost entirely to the Supreme Court's failure to
understand either that this is the objective or to understand the
nature of fault itself.'®
III.

NIETZSCHE AND ARETAIC LEGAL THEORY

Much of Nietzsche's description of punishment before the rise
of ascetic philosophies brings to mind an aretaic conception of
punishment based on the virtue ethics of Aristotle. Kantian
punishment theory is inadequate to the task of explaining criminal
fault in all its richness because Kantian morality is slave morality,
and because it displays a cramped, desiccated conception of
human agency and responsibihty." We have to go back to the
origins of punishment and retrieve a different conception of
agency and responsibihty in order to make sense of our actual
practices in punishment.
The Nietzschean conception of
responsibility, hke the Aristotelian, is premised on an idea of
human flourishing, and both philosophers advance a thick
conception of human agency and responsibihty contrasts strongly
with Kant's construction of the will. Not surprisingly, then, the
aretaic theory of punishment fits Nietzsche's implicit description of
an adequate theory of punishment.
First, the aretaic theory of punishment is a product of the
aristocratic ideal because it predates the rise of Judeo-Christian
religion and subsequent ascetic philosophies, including
deontological morahty and consequentialism. Second, aretaic
legal theory describes punishment and responsibility in terms of
the rational governance of desire and motivation, and not merely
in terms of the will's rational mastery. Third, the concept of virtue,
the heart of aretaic legal theory, rests on a notion of human
flourishing that not only reiterates and expands upon Nietzsche's
5'' See generally Huigens, Homicide, supra note 36 (describing this as a pressing task in
criminal law theory and giving recent examples of how it ought and ought not to be done).
See Huigens, Rethinking, supra note 36, at 1257-82.
5' See NIETZSCHE, supra note 1, at 28-29,94-95.
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account of master morality, but that also clears the notion of
human flourishing of some of the unsavory associations that
Nietzsche imposed on the idea.
Nietzsche describes responsibility in terms of the will, but
does not construe will as the bare capacity for choice, which is a
late Kantian accretion on the idea.® Instead, Nietzsche refuses to
divorce the will from the other attributes of human beings, and
emphasizes the importance of strength and resolve to the will.
Responsibility begins with the acquisition of memory and the
capacity to make and keep promises.®^ The person who displays
these attributes can free himself from the morality of custom and
act as a sovereign, "an autonomous, supra-ethical individual
(because 'autonomous' and 'ethical' are mutually exclusive).""
ResponsibUity is a matter of strength of will because the only one
who can truly keep a promise is one who can withstand reversals
of fortune. The strength of will that is required for the making and
keeping of promises is conscience."
Conscience is acquired through pain and is inculcated through
the cruel imposition of suffering. "'A thing must be burnt in so
that it stays in the memory ... that is a proposition from the oldest
(and unfortunately the longest-lived) psychology on earth."®
Ascetic philosophies obviously partake of these methods, but the
methods predate those philosophies. Judeo-Christian rehgion
posits a God to give meaning to suffering, but cruelty was first
instrumental in inculcating the rudiments of responsibihty.
Significantly, this kind of governance takes hold at the level of
motivation and desire. Responsibility is not a matter of choosing
in accord with the dictates of reason; it substantially predates such
a conception of reason.
[T]hink of old German punishments such as stoning...
breaking on the wheel... impaling, ripping apart and trampling
to death by horses ("quartering"), boiling of the criminal in oil
or wine ... , the popular flajang ("cutting strips"), cutting out
flesh from the breast; and, of course, coating the wrong-doer
with honey and leaving him to the flies in the scorching sun.
With the aid of such images and procedures, man was
eventually able to retain five or six "I-don't-want-to's" in his
memory, in connection with which a promise had been made, in
order to enjoy the advantages of society—^and there you are!
With the aid of this sort of memory, people finally came to
^ See id. at 43.
See id. at 39-40.
Mat40.
® See id. at 41-42.
® Id. at 41.
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"reason"!^'

One should not overlook the significance of the term "I-don'twant-to's." For Nietzsche, the original conception of responsibility
is a matter of what one does and does not want to do—a matter of
desire and motivation—not a matter of whether one chooses in
accordance with reason's dictates on the occasion of action.
Just as the Kantian conception of responsibility is a late
accretion on a quite different conception of responsibility, so is the
Kantian conception of retribution. In the deontological theory of
punishment, retribution is required in response to wongdoing
because the wrongdoer has chosen to set himself against society
and above his victim, thereby implying a principle of action that
applies to himself, which in turn implies his exclusion from the
rights of society and his degradation through punishment.®*
However, long before this abstract conception of retribution
developed, retribution was a matter of payment of debt in which
"the creditor takes part in the rights of the masters: at last he, too,
shares the elevated feeling of despising and maltreating someone
as an 'inferior'
Even the familiar conception of retribution
as revenge that has been tamed and civilized is wrong in
Nietzsche's view. Punishment has to do with the emotions,
Nietzsche argues, but not with reactive emotions such as revenge.
Instead, it has to do with the active emotions such as a lust for
power and possessions. Justice originates with the moral
aristocracy, "the strong, the spontaneous and the aggressive," who
"have partly expended their strength in trying to put a stop to the
spread of reactive pathos...."®®
Everywhere that justice is practised and maintained, the
stronger power can be seen looking for means of putting an end
to the senseless ravages of ressentiment amongst those inferior
to it (whether groups or individuals), partly by lifting the object
of ressentiment out of the hands of revenge, partly by
substituting, for revenge, a struggle against the enemies of
peace and order, partly by working out compensation,
suggesting, sometimes enforcing it, and partly by promoting
certain equivalences for wrongs into a norm which ressentiment,
from now on, has to take into account.®'

These efforts on the part of the moral aristocracy turn
punishment into the opposite of revenge—^into an impersonal
« Id.aXAl.

« See Hampton, supra note 23, at 1686-87 (describing retribution as vindicating the
victim's worth in part by degrading the wrongdoer).
6' NIETZSCHE, supra note 1, at 45.
68 Id. at 53.

® Id.
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matter of retribution in which descriptions of "just" and "unjust"
exist after the creation of a legal system, and not before it.™
Describing roughly the same arc of history—^from the origin
of punishment in notions of debt to a sophisticated legal
retributivism—^Nietzsche describes the succession of meanings
attributed to the experience of being punished. He describes the
experience of those who originally experienced punishment as a
kind of resignation to fate or misfortune and claims that they
would have felt only sadness at the turn of events.^^ In the first
dawnings of critical awareness, the moral aristocracy would have
sought to turn punishment to other ends:
[W]e must certainly seek the actual effect of punishment
primarily in the sharpening of intelligence, in a lengthening of
the memory, in a will to be more cautious, less trusting, to go
about things more circumspectly from now on, in the
recognition that one was, once and for all, too weak for many
things, in a sort of improvement of self-assessment.™

However, Nietzsche concludes, all that actually can be
accomplished is an increase of fear and a mastering of desires.
Punishment cannot make man better; it can only tame him and
make him stupid.™ Among the other accretions of meaning on
punishment—^not only Kantian retribution, but also deterrence,
festival, incapacitation, and racial or social purity—^Nietzsche
singles out one construal of punishment's purpose as especially
disappointing: the inculcation of bad conscience, the feeling of
guilt that might enable the convict to govern himself properly in
the future. Nietzsche observes how unlikely it is that punishment
eould lead to such a result. The prisoner either becomes harder
and more resistant to change or he is completely debased and
acquires "a dry, morose solemnity."™
At this point, we ought to set aside Nietzsche's own pessimism
and appreciate the extent to which he has uncovered a conception
of punishment that is independent of Judeo-Christian religion and
deontological morality. At the conclusion of the Genealogy'^
sections on punishment in section 15 of Essay II, Nietzsche focuses
on the act of punishment, and it is not surprising that this induces
pessimism. But we ought to back up a few sections, to section 11,
and recognize, as Nietzsche does there, that it is legal theory and
doctrine, not the immediate instrumentalities of punishment, that

71
72
73
7"

See id. at 54.
See id. at 59.
Id. at 60.
See id.
Id. at 59.
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matter the most to society. It makes sense, then, temporarily to set
aside the problems at the sharp end of the practice and rethink
punishment starting at the other, speculative end. We are after a
legal theory that meets the aristocratic ideal and that provides a
solution to doctrinal problems in the criminal law such as the
proper construction of fault. Whether or not punishment can ever
do anything but make men stupid is a question that we can set
aside for the moment.
What of the sadness that the original offenders are said to
have felt?" It is, apparently, not yet remorse, but only regret. The
law could not inculcate conscience and these offenders did not
have it. Their response to punishment was not reflective and they
did not engage in the kind of conscientious self-governance that
features remorse. But this is not to say they were not governed by
law. They were governed, Nietzsche argues, by the experience and
image of punishment's cruelty, from which they could acquire a
handful of "I-don't-want-to's." That is, they could and did
undergo a certain amount of shaping at the level of their desires
and motivations."
This level of unconscious obedience cannot be recovered, and
we have no need to recover it. We rightly regard the prospect of
the law's governing by means of subliminal conditioning with
horror. But the next step in the historical progression—^the moral
aristocracy's conception of punishment as governing us just
beneath the level of the rational determination of the will—^is
eminently recoverable. Indeed, in light of Kant's desiccated
conception of the will and the influence it has had on AngloAmerican legal theory and doctrine, we would do well to recover
this pre-Kantian conception of punishment and responsibility. But
if we are to describe governance, not only of the will, but also of
desire, then we must employ a richer conception of human agency,
one that integrates the other attributes of the human agent—^her
strength, her sexuality, her imagination—^into our conceptions of
action and responsibility. This integration will lead us, one hopes,
to the moral aristocracy's rich conception of punishment's
effects—"the sharpening of intelligence, in a lengthening of the
memory, in a will to be more cautious, less trusting, to go about
things more circumspectly from now on""—^between the original
conditioning by cruelty and the "dry, morose solemnity" of
Kantian self-mastery.
The moral aristocracy's critically aware assessment of
See id.
See id. at 42.
77 Id. at 60.
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punishment is just that which Nietzsche describes as unattainable
in 11.15: the account of punishment's effects as including the
enhancement of memory, a will to caution and circumspection, and
a more accurate self-assessment, including a sense of one's
weakness in many areas of life.™ Nietzsche concludes that these
things are not attainable through punishment, and that only the
mastery of desire through fear is possible. But again, it is
advisable to set aside Nietzsche's pessimism so that we can
examine what is offered here. Nietzsche describes rational
governance at the level of desire—^not merely the mastery of
desire in the Kantian sense of its subjection to reason by will, but
the shaping of desire—^the deliberate, reflective acquisition of
attitudes and dispositions to caution, to circumspection, to
modesty, to introspection, and so on. This is a conception of
punishment's effects that falls between the rational governance of
the bare will and the conditioning of the agent subliminally
through terror. It contemplates the rational governance of desire
through the acquisition of a set of standing motivations. It
contemplates punishment as a process of inculcating the virtues.
In short, the conception of punishment that Nietzsche has invoked
here is an aretaic theory of punishment.
We need not share Nietzsche's pessimism about such an
understanding of punishment. Punishment can do no more than to
make men stupid.™ Punishment need not merely harden the
prisoner or force him into "a dry, morose solemnity.Unlike
Nietzsche, we do not live in a society dominated by Christianity;
we live in a world that has to a great extent rediscovered an
appreciation for the merely human, as Nietzsche advocated. And
we have concrete reasons to be more optimistic about the
prospects for genuine punishment, especially under the guidance
of an aretaic theory of punishment.
For example, the United States has actively promoted the
creation of drug treatment courts in local and state jurisdictions
around the country. In these courts, the offender pleads guilty to a
drug offense, but sentencing is suspended pending his completion
of a drug treatment program. Upon successful completion, his
conviction is vacated and all charges are dropped. Inevitable
lapses during the course of treatment are dealt with by a system of
graduated sanctions in which termination of the program and
incarceration are the last resort. Political conservatives attack
drug treatment courts because the offenders do not seem to
See id.
See id.
80 Id. at 59.
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receive their just deserts. Political liberals attack drug treatment
courts because the loss of liberty and pain inflicted as part of the
treatment is degrading to the offender in a way that incarceration
is not: it addresses him patemalistically, as an invalid or an
incompetent, instead of as a responsible peer. The aretaic theory
of punishment answers both sets of objections by portraying drug
treatment as genuine punishment inflicted as retribution for past
wrongdoing.®^
The key point in this analysis is that an aretaic theory of
punishment allows us to draw a distinction between two kinds of
rehabiUtation. Therapeutic rehabilitation addresses pathology,
whereas aretaic rehabilitation consists of habituation to virtue,
which is a feature of normal human development. Neither the
development of a good character nor our efforts to improve
character address illness. Indeed, the possibility of affecting
character in these ways as well as the responsibihty premised on
this possibiUty presupposes that one is mentally and physically
healthy. This distinction is important, because it turns out that
drug treatment involves at least as much character-building as it
does the medical and psychoanalytic treatment of pathological
alcohol and drug use. The former serves as a necessary base of
support for the latter. For example, one court-supervised
treatment program includes classes in substance abuse and relapse
prevention, but it also includes classes in anger manapment,
effective social communication, and ethnic contributions to
civilization.®^ These latter classes do not address pathologies; they
are aimed at improved character: a temperate disposition, the
ability to listen to others and to speak without rancor, and the selfesteem that comes from a consciousness of one's ties to a larger
community and history. In short, much of the programming
received in drug treatment courts is aimed at enabling the
defendant to meet the very responsibihty that is at the heart of
desert: the responsibility for the state of his character. Given that
this is done because of a criminal conviction and against the
offender's will, it is genuine punishment. But it is punishment that
does more than make people stupid or morose.

81 See Kyron Huigens, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and Theories of Punishment: A
Response to Brown, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1,22 (2002).
82 See ADELE FIARRELL, SHANNON CAVANAGH & JOHN ROMAN, THE URBAN
INSTITUTE: FINAL REPORT: FINDINGS FROM THE EVALUATION OF THE D.C. SUPERIOR
COURT DRUG INTERVENTION PROGRAM 1 (1998).
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CONCLUSION

It may seem inconsistent with the grand spirit of Nietzschean
philosophizing to give a Nietzschean account of mundane matters
such as strict liabihty or drug treatment courts. The tendency
lately has been instead to envision a fundamental shift in human
perception as the first step in political reform. But in addition to
the manifest futihty of that strategy, one ought to be able to see
that the way in which aretaic legal theory resolves hardened
dilemmas and transcends entrenched political positions is its most
Nietzschean feature. Nietzsche sought to overcome nihilism by
breaking down existing categories. His perspectivism is an
important part of this project, and until now, Ms perspectivism has
played the largest role of any of his ideas in Anglo-American legal
theory. The aretaic theory of punishment is part of this tradition,
and yet it breaks down existing categories to a purpose beyond
reiterating endlessly that language, value, and meamng are
indeterminate and mampulable. It offers specific concepts,
analyses, doctrinal innovations, and policy prescriptions to replace
existing categories with a view to making law contribute more
effectively to the good life. To see this as contrary to Nietzsche's
project is to overemphasize Ms perspectivism and to ignore Ms
concern with overcommg modern slave morality and nihilism
tMough the recapture of the aristocratic ideal. Human flourishing
is part of that latter ideal, and it is as solid a basis as any for a new
legal order.

